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Recent studies link the performance of regional technology clusters to their social 
organization.  In an influential study of the success of Silicon Valley, Saxenian (1994) 
argues that the region benefits from a decentralized structure encouraging the formation 
of diffuse social ties linking scientists and engineers across local companies.  This article 
examines the emergence of social structures supporting biotechnology across three 
regions of California: San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego.  Social network 
analysis methods are used to trace the formation of social ties linking some 2500 senior 
managers working within California biotechnology between 1976 to 2005.  Findings 
show that San Francisco biotechnology succeeded quickly because it inherited an 
appropriate social structure for the sector from the Silicon Valley electronics industry.  
San Diego, on the other hand, was a region with no previous high-technology.  Social 
networks supporting biotechnology were constructed in the region through the 
unanticipated collapse of an early key firm, Hybritech, which lead to the formation of 
over a dozen spin-offs linked through founder networks.  Los Angeles, despite being 
home to the industry’s leading firm, Amgen, has not developed a successful 
biotechnology industry, nor has it developed a social structure to support marketplace 
formation in the region.  In sum, through exploring scenarios by which social structures 
supporting high-technology industry emerge (or, in the case of Los Angeles, fail to 
emerge), the article aims to contribute to broader debates theoretical exploring the 
sociological basis of economic development.   
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Social Structure and Marketplace Formation within California Biotechnology 
 
 
Clusters of high-technology firms have become an important source of economic 
development across the advanced industrial economies (Storper 1997; Braunerhjelm and 
Feldman 2006).  Recent studies of technology clusters have linked their performance to 
their economic and social organization.  A central explanation focuses on the 
organization of social structures within technology clusters.  In an influential study of the 
success of Silicon Valley, Saxenian (1994) argues that the region benefits from a 
decentralized structure encouraging the formation of diffuse social ties linking scientists 
and engineers across local companies helps diffuse innovation, while from the point of 
view of skilled individuals, manage the career risks of working in failure-prone 
companies.  This explanation emphasizes the social embeddednes of economic action, as 
companies embedded within regions with a decentralized culture of high mobility and 
knowledge diffusion will have a “regional advantage” over companies that are not 
(Saxenian 1994; Herrigel 1994; Sabel 1992). 
While providing a persuasive explanation for the success of some regional 
clusters over others, a difficulty with the social structure explanation is that it only makes 
sense once a large agglomeration of companies coupled with norms and social networks 
encouraging inter-firm mobility and communication exist.  Left unexplored are the 
mechanisms by which regions move from a starting position in which neither the 
agglomeration of companies or decentralized social structure exist to one in which they 
do.  How do regional technology clusters, and the social structure underpinning them, 
emerge and become sustainable?   
This article examines the emergence of social structures supporting biotechnology 
across three regions of California: San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego.  The 
article draws on social network analysis methods to trace the formation of social ties 
linking some 2500 senior managers working within California biotechnology.  The 
characteristics of social networks are mapped within California from the initial 
commercialization of biotechnology in San Francisco by Genentech in 1976, up until 
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2005.  The study is designed to create a lens by which explore mechanisms by which 
social ties linking companies within technology clusters emerge.  
 California biotechnology also poses an interesting puzzle: while world class 
universities, which are widely seen as a prerequisite for the emergence of biotechnology 
firms (Darby and Zucker, 1996), existed in each of the three regions studied, only two of 
them, San Francisco and San Diego, have developed successful biotechnology clusters.  
Los Angeles, despite being home to premier research institutes such as the California 
Institute of Technology and one extremely successful early biotechnology company, 
Amgen, has not developed a sustainable biotechnology industry.  While the San 
Francisco and San Diego regions have each launched over 200 biotechnology firms and 
have seen about 65 companies reach the significant goal of attaining an initial public 
offering on a stock market, only 31 biotechnology companies have been founded in Los 
Angeles between 1980 and 2005.  Moreover, of these firms, only Amgen has become 
publicly traded through an IPO. The study will demonstrate that the divergent 
performance across these clusters can at least partly be explained by the social structure 
approach: both San Diego and San Francisco succeeded in developing decentralized 
social structures supporting companies, while Los Angeles has not.   
The study explores differences by which decentralized social structures 
supporting biotechnology emerged in San Francisco and San Diego.  Drawing on 
institutional theory, the article will argue that individuals employed within the San 
Francisco biotechnology industry ihherited norms Silicon Valley legitimizing the 
establishment of social ties across companies and sanctioning frequent career mobility 
across firms.  Genentech and other early biotechnology companies benefited from being 
located in close proximity to Silicon Valley.  The area’s early firms inherited norms 
encouraging information sharing and flexible labor markets that were common within the 
region’s semiconductor and computer industry.   
The San Diego region, on the other hand, was not home to a significant high-
technology industry prior to the launch of its first biotechnology firm in 1978.  To 
explore mechanisms of social structure emergence in “greenfield” regions such as San 
Diego, constructivist approaches are appropriate (see e.g. Sabel, 1993).  A key theoretical 
metaphor from social network studies surrounding social structure construction surrounds 
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the development of a “backbone” of social ties within a region.  Once formed, these ties 
serve as a resource for companies, thus increasing their innovative capacity.  Moreover, 
they form the basis of a credible referral network other individuals could tap into to 
obtain jobs and, as the network expanded, reduce the career risk of working within one of 
the region’s technology companies.  Within San Diego a network background emerged 
through the failed acquisition of Hybritech, a prominent and successful early company.  
Due to poor management practices by the acquiring company, a cadre of at least two 
dozen senior managers and scientists left Hybritech within the first two years after the 
acquisition.  They went on to form the backbone of entrepreneurial networks linking most 
of the region’s core biotechnology companies, and through doing so spurring the rapid 
growth of biotechnology in San Diego.    
 Through exploring scenarios by which social structures supporting high-
technology industry emerge (or, in the case of Los Angeles, fail to emerge), the article 
aims to contribute to broader debates exploring the sociological basis of economic 
development.  While California biotechnology developed without direct policy 
intervention, governments around the world have in recent years attempted to orchestrate 
the development of biotechnology clusters. However, empirical studies have shown that 
there are very few successful high-technology clusters.  San Francisco and San Diego 
represent two of only three large and successful biotechnology clusters in the world 
(Boston is the third).  If successful clusters are linked to the establishment of a 
decentralized social structure, cases of their successful emergence might be extremely 
rare.  Documenting mechanisms of emergence across the few successful clusters that do 
exist is an important step in designing comparative research capable of yielding 
generalizations applicable across clusters and, from the perspective of public policy, 
evaluating whether governments can usefully intervene in this field.  
 
Social structure and the sustainability of technology clusters 
 
While a long tradition of research has sought to explain industries often 
agglomerate within regions (see e.g. Freeman and Soete 1997 for a review), the central 
argument linking social structure to the performance of regional high technology clusters 
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was developed by Saxenian (1994) through a comparison of the Silicon Valley and Route 
128/Boston regional semiconductor industries (see also Almeida and Kogut 1999 and 
Fleming et. al. 2005 for follow-up studies on Silicon Valley, and Herrigel 1993 for a 
similar argument applied to Baden Wurttemberg in Germany).  Saxenian argues that 
Silicon Valley’s success is linked to the development of a decentralized social structure 
encouraging the development of numerous informal links across the region’s scientists, 
engineers, and managers.  Norms legitimizing frequent contact between scientists and 
engineers working across organizations is an important element of this social structure.  
However, Silicon Valley has also been shown to have unusually high job mobility 
(Saxenian, NN; Almeida and Kogut 1999), helping to generate dense social networks 
linking employee’s of the region’s firms. 
 Two mechanisms exist whereby the development of a decentralized social 
structure might raise the performance of companies within a region.  First, social ties 
linking scientists, engineers, and managers across organization can help diffuse 
knowledge across a region’s firms.  In particular, embededness within a decentralized 
social structure may provide a competitive advantage for technology-intensive firms 
operating in market segments in which technological volatility is high.  To give an 
example from biotechnology, Pennan (1996) conducted a bibliometric survey of 
approaches being used to develop therapies for Alzheimer’s disease and found over 20 
distinct technological approaches being pursued by competing teams of biotechnology 
firms, basic research labs, and large pharmaceutical companies. Within highly 
competitive new technology fields such as this, informal ties across firms may provide 
market or technological intelligence, allowing companies to make superior decisions as to 
which technologies to adopt or, at times discontinue.  Firms may be able to react to 
market developments faster than competitors.  
Second, decentralized social structures may also provide companies with an edge 
in recruiting highly skilled employees.  The success of technology start-ups is in part 
determined by their ability to entice skilled managers and employees to leave lucrative 
and often ‘safe’ jobs in established companies or universities to join a new venture 
(Whitley 2004; Baron and Hannan, 2002). Skilled employees and managers are typically 
given grants of company stock or stock-options as an incentive to join work intensive 
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start-ups (Kenney and Florida 1988).  Should the company succeed and “go public” 
through a stock offering or be acquired at a favorable valuation early employees can earn 
vast payouts (Lerner and Gompers 2001).  However, the potential benefits of working 
within a start-up are countered by a high likelihood that employment tenures within start-
ups will be short due to dismissals or outright failure.  Most start-ups fail to reach a 
lucrative exit, be it an initial public offering or acquisition by a larger firm at a favorable 
valuation.  Venture capitalists often decide to halt investments in new technology 
companies that fail to meet key milestones.  Dismissals of top management are often a 
common response by VC-led boards to firms that have failed to meet development 
milestones. Managers and employees within start-ups also find themselves at risk of 
dismissal due to strategic decisions to change the competency structure of the firm.  
Moreover, as a condition to invest, many venture capitalists insist that early technical 
founders of companies often need to be replaced by professional managers as a company 
develops.  
From the point of view of individuals, there is a strong rationale for choosing to 
work only within start-up companies embedded within a regional cluster in which social 
ties promoting mobility are strong.  Doing so can dramatically lower the career risk for 
founding teams and R&D staffs by creating numerous alternate employment options 
should a given venture fail, undergo managerial shakeups at the behest of investors, or 
need to change its competency structure due to technological volatility (Bahrami and 
Evans 1999).  This helps explain why successful and presumably risk adverse scientists 
and managers would give up prestigious careers in established companies or university 
labs to work within lucrative but highly risky start-ups: within successful clusters the 
embeddednes of individuals within social networks makes it safe to do so.  To quote 
Saxenian, “Moving from job to job in Silicon Valley was not as disruptive of personal, 
social, or professional ties as it could be elsewhere.” (Saxenian 1994: 35).   
While focusing attention on explaining successful cases, and especially Silicon 
Valley, the social structure approach also contains an explanation of why most regional 
economies fail.  Most clusters, even if they reach sufficient size, do not develop the social 
networks or norms of high labor market flexibility needed to create the ‘regional 
advantage’ associated with Silicon Valley.  Lacking a safety net provided by career 
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affiliation networks, leaving a safe job to work within a failure prone start-up is truly a 
risky proposition, one that risk-averse individuals will likely resist.  According to 
Saxenian’s research, for example, the decline of Boston/Route 128’s computer and 
semiconductor industry was influenced by autarkic practices of long-term employment 
within its companies that hindered the creation of flexible labor markets, along with 
norms within many companies that shunned informal information sharing across 
companies.  This limited the capacity of the area’s companies to adapt challenges created 
by the development of the personal computer industry in Silicon Valley in the early 
1980s (Saxenian 1994, ch. 3). 
 Comparative research suggests that very few technology clusters have achieved 
either the critical mass of companies or regional innovative advantage associated with 
Silicon Valley.  In the biotechnology industry, for example, only three large regional 
clusters exist, in San Francisco, San Diego, and Boston, despite the introduction of 
dozens of policy initiatives aimed at creating biotechnology clusters across the world (see 
e.g. Romaneli and Feldman 2006 for evidence from the United States and Casper 2007 
for research on Europe). Research on the semiconductor industry has also found that very 
few large regional clusters exist.  Almeida and Kogut, for example, followed-up 
Saxenian’s research with a quantitative study using patent data from twelve US 
semiconductor clusters.  Patent data was used to gather information on levels of inter-
firm mobility of inventors within each cluster and as an indicator of aggregate 
innovativeness.  Their study supported Saxenian’s argument, showing that only Silicon 
Valley had both high levels of job mobility, presumably facilitated by a decentralized 
social structure, as well as a higher innovative capacity documented through markedly 
higher levels of patenting.   
 
Social networks and the emergence of social structure 
 
The rarity of well-performing clusters suggests that the development of an 
appropriate social infrastructures to support new technology companies a difficult 
problem, perhaps one rarely solved.  The issue of emergence, of moving essentially from 
“nothing” to the generation of a decentralized social infrastructure capable of diffusing 
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innovation and facilitating career management, has only begun to be systematically 
examined (see e.g. and Uzzi and Spri 2005; Flemming 2004; Kogut, Urso, and Walker 
2007)  This study draws on two different approaches within research on social theory to 
conceptualize the emergence of social structure.  A first, constructivist approach 
emphasizes the agency of individuals, companies, and other social actors to build the 
necessary social infrastructure needed to orient the behavior of individuals towards a 
desired pattern.  A second, institutional approach emphasizes the importance of 
overarching or preexisting rules or norms governing economic activity within a given 
locality.  Applied to the emergence of regional technology clusters, appropriate social 
structures for a local technology cluster will develop when actors inherit pre-existing 
norms of behavior within a region that are conducive towards its formation.   
 
Constructivism and the emergence of new social structures 
 
The first approach draws on constructivist theories within sociology and political 
science (see e.g. Sabel 1993; Ruggie 1998; Berger and Luckmann 1967).  This 
approaches encourages an agency centered perspective, focusing on processes by which 
social actors to develop the social ties, norms, or institutions needed to govern their 
activities.  The key conceptual task of this approach is to explore scenarios by which 
actors within a region may plausibly construct the patterns of social ties that may 
coalesce into a more enduring social structure.  The constructivist approach seems 
particularly appropriate for examining regions that currently do not have a significant 
technology industry, and thus must develop social structures needed to support it.   
The rarity of well-performing technology clusters suggests that the construction of 
a decentralized social structure is difficult to achieve. Decentralized social structures 
likely share characteristics analogous to a collective or public good: its benefits accrue to 
most if not all individuals and companies within the regional economy.  However, unlike 
traditional public goods maintained by governments or other dominant actors (roadways, 
the air), social infrastructures supporting technology clusters may be difficult to 
orchestrate or maintain in a systematic fashion.  Rather, it is an emergent property, a 
product of the collective behavior of individuals and firms within a regional economy.  
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As such, it is unlikely that individuals or firms can single-handedly develop the necessary 
mesh of social ties needed to sustain a highly innovative cluster.  A relatively large 
number of individuals must develop and mobilize social relationships in order to develop 
a density of ties sufficient to generate an overarching social structure capable of 
providing benefits to firms and individuals. What are the mechanisms by which regions 
move from a starting position in which neither the agglomeration of companies or social 
networks underpinning mobility exist to one in which they do?  
One potential logic of emergence is that social networks develop slowly or 
incrementally.  Early entrants to a cluster might be particularly risk acceptant individuals.  
They might enter due to extraordinarily attractive opportunity conditions associated with 
the technology they are attempting to commercialize, either because the industry is new 
or because their particular technology is seen by experts in the field as representing a 
particularly strong value proposition.  Once one or more early companies are established 
in a region and experience success, additional companies might be encouraged to enter a 
local industry.  If key individuals from early companies take jobs at new firms, or, as well 
documented in the early development of Silicon Valley (Lécuyer 2006), are encouraged 
to found start-ups, social ties linking a region’s firms will begin to develop.  As a region’s 
nexus of companies continues to expand social ties might increase in density.  It is 
possible that, after reaching a certain size and rate of mobility, a tipping point could be 
reached whereby the cluster becomes sustainable and regional innovation effects begin to 
accrue.   
There are two difficulties with this explanation.  First, social network effects may 
only be pronounced once a large number of individuals participate in the network; 
benefits may only develop as social networks become relatively large and efficiently 
organized.  If so, early pioneers within a cluster may be particularly failure prone.  Early 
failures are likely to be much more costly, in terms of their effects on social network 
growth, than later failures. This is both because of possible negative demonstration 
effects within the region created by early failures, and because individuals employed by 
these early firms will have fewer local job opportunities and might be more likely to 
return to “safer” jobs in more stable organizations or seek employment in entrepreneurial 
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firms outside the region.  If so, nascent technology clusters might never reach the critical 
mass to become sustainable.   
Second, early companies might succeed, but develop inward focused corporate 
cultures and human resource policies that shun extensive personnel mobility into and out 
of the company in favor of long-term employment policies.  Saxenian’s (1994) research 
on the Boston/128 computer industry documents this scenario.  Companies adopting 
autarkic strategies will not contribute significantly to social network development within 
a region.  There is also a possibility norms “imprinted” on follow-on companies within 
the region will follow similar inward-focused corporate cultures.  Within the Los Angeles 
region social networks have failed to develop across companies.  While this study will 
not explore the cause of this failure in detail, a recent history of the region’s dominant 
biotechnology firm, Amgen, suggests that the firm has developed an inward looking 
culture favoring long-term employment and a policy of filling most vacancies with 
internal promotions (Binder and Bashe 2008, ch. 9-10).  
If the gradual construction of social ties within a region is problematic, perhaps 
social structures may be engineered, in a sense, to develop more rapidly.  A key 
theoretical metaphor here is that, to gain momentum, a “backbone” of social ties must 
exist in a region (Powell et al 2005).  Once formed, these ties can serve as resources for 
companies, thus increasing their innovative capacity.  Moreover, they would form the 
basis of a credible referral network other individuals could tap into to obtain jobs and, as 
the network expanded, reduce the career risk of working within one of the region’s 
technology companies.  The credibility of this early network would increase to the extent 
that prominent individuals within the region were linked into the network.   
A key problem with the orchestrated approach is identifying mechanisms to 
rapidly construct social networks.  One approach, which would have important public 
policy implications if valid, is for governments is to orchestrate the “seeding” of a 
cluster’s early development.  This approach has been used frequently around the world, 
perhaps with some success in areas such as Munich, Germany (see e.g. Casper 2007).  
However, in California there is little evidence that governments have actively 
orchestrating cluster development.  Rapid social network construction did occur in San 
Diego, primarily as a consequence of the failed acquisition of Hybritech.  Reviewing this 
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case will demonstrates that social network backbones quickly form within a local market 
context, but also suggests that this occurrence might be contingent on factors difficult to 
orchestrate through, for example, public policy. 
 
The institutional approach and the inheritance scenario 
 
Institutional approaches views the establishment of a dense network of social ties 
linking firms within a regional economy as the outcome of broader legal rules and norms 
within the region that sanction or encourage this behavior (see e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 
1983).   Institutional research focuses on enduring patterns of behavior created by legal 
frameworks, but also rules and norms created over time as a result of the social 
interaction of actors (see e.g. North, 1992).  Within the realm of regional cluster 
development, a prominent example of the institutional perspective stems from recent 
research on Silicon Valley linking the prevalence of job-hopping to state laws in 
California that strike down “non-compete” clauses that can create barriers to employees 
moving to similar jobs in rival companies (see Hyde 1998; Gilson 1999).  This legal rule 
clearly encourages inter-firm mobility and may be a catalyst for the formation of 
decentralized social structures.  However, it by itself cannot explain the divergence of 
case outcomes across California’s three major biotechnology clusters, particularly the 
failure of Los Angeles biotechnology. 
 From the institutional perspective, the formation of a new technology cluster may 
be strongly impacted by the existence of norms and rules within a region structuring the 
behavior of individuals within companies.  Participants in a new industry may inherit 
patterns of behavior previously established in a given region.  If rules and norms lead to 
the more autarkic of company focused patterns of behavior, in which employees do not 
regulatory share information with other regional companies and local norms focus on 
long-term loyalty to established companies, then strong networks of ties linking 
companies are unlikely to develop.  On the other hand, if rules and norms within a region 
sanction communication between individuals working within different firms and 
legitimate frequent job hopping across firms, especially the act of leaving one’s firm to 
found a new, often competing enterprise, then decentralized social structures will develop.  
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The San Francisco biotechnology industry is strong candidate to have inherited its 
social structure from the preexisting Silicon Valley computer and semiconductor industry. 
The region was first to establish a biotechnology industry.  While the emergence of 
biotechnology in the San Francisco region was critically influenced by the invention of 
key genetic engineering and related molecular biology techniques at UCSF and Stanford, 
Genentech and other early biotechnology spin-outs benefited from being located in close 
proximity to Silicon Valley.  The area’s early firms inherited norms encouraging 
information sharing and flexible labor markets that were common within the 




The study uses social network analysis tools to examine how social structures 
emerged within regional biotechnology industries located across California’s three major 
regions: San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles.  Social network analysis tools can 
be used to map out the architecture of such ties and compare their characteristics over 
time (Faust and Wasserman, 1996).  If a social structure facilitating high levels of 
exchange and career mobility across companies is indeed a determinant of success within 
regional technology clusters, then comparing the structure of social ties across multiple 
regions, and especially how these structures change over time, can be a useful research 
strategy.   
The study examines the emergence of career affiliation networks formed between 
senior managers of California biotechnology firms on the basis of ties between 
individuals that are formed through joint employment at the same organization (see 
Casper 2007).  Within the biotechnology industry senior management usually includes a 
company’s chief executive, chief scientific officer, chief finance officer, and a number of 
vice presidents and senior personnel involved in research and development, business 
development, and, within some companies, human resources and legal affairs.  Senior 
managers must define a firm’s strategy and mobilize the necessary resources to 
implement it. Recruiting talented senior management is strongly linked to the success of 
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biotechnology companies (Gulati and Higgins 2003).  In this respect, an emphasis on top 
management again links directly to the emphasis on career mobility.   
The study traces the emergence of social networks linking senior managers 
employed over the history of California’s biotechnology industry, beginning with the 
founding of Genentech in San Francisco in 1976 and concluding in 2005.  Social 
networks linking 2285 senior managers employed in 448 California biotechnology firms 
established between 1976 and 2005 are analyzed.  As a supplemental database, career 
histories for all founders of each region’s biotechnology companies was also created.  
This database includes 505 founders, but includes several dozen academic founders of 
companies that did not leave their university job to work full-time as a biotechnology 
managers, and are thus not included in the social network analysis.   
The biotechnology industry was chosen for study due to its status as a high 
technology industry containing high technological volatility (see Henderson, Orsenigo, 
and Pisano 1999).  Opportunity conditions in biotechnology are often attractive, as large, 
multi-billion dollar markets exist for drug and diagnostics products meeting unmet 
medical needs, and intellectual regimes surrounding new treatments are strong.  While a 
few successful firms have generated enormous profits, failure rates are high in the 
biotechnology industry (see Pisano 2007).  Most companies eventually fail or are cheaply 
acquired and integrated into competitors or large pharmaceutical companies. An Internet 
database located within the Biotech Career Center (2006) lists several hundred failed 
companies. Given both technological volatility and high failure rates, biotechnology is an 
industry in which resources provided to firms and their employees by the existence of a 
decentralized social structure are likely to be significant.  Moreover, a key theme 
emerging from research on the biotechnology industry is the decentralization of 
knowledge within the industry and the need for companies to develop and tap into a 
variety of external networks if they are to succeed (Powell 1996; Powell, Doerr, and 
Koput 1996; Shan, Walker, and Kogut 1994).  
Following Powell et. al. (2005) the study focused primarily on biotechnology 
companies specialized in human therapeutics and molecular diagnostics. Only research 
intensive and independent biotechnology companies were included in the database; local 
subsidiaries of corporations headquartered outside California were not included.   
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However, a small number of companies were included in the areas of agricultural 
biotechnology and so-called platform biotechnologies (such as DNA chips and related 
assays) that were clearly R&D intensive, drew from university research, and were 
initially financed through venture capitalists.  Medical device companies and engineering 
or “hardware” related platform biotechnology companies in areas such as instrumentation 
were not included in the study 
California is an excellent laboratory to study cluster development.  As mentioned 
earlier, the study’s research design selects two successful cases, San Diego and San 
Francisco, and one failure case, Los Angeles.  The variance in outcomes across 
California’s three core regions is interesting given their geographical proximity and 
exposure to identical national and state level legal frameworks regulating both business 
and the commercialization of science.  Moreover, the focus on California allows the 
research design to plausibly control for one factor that is crucial to the development of 
commercial biotechnology: the existence of world-class university research in the 
biosciences.  The importance of university-firm ties has led to the establishment of most 
biotechnology clusters in close proximity to leading universities (Zucker et. al. 1999; 
Murray 2004).   Each of the three regions studied has several leading universities, 
medical schools, and research institutes focused on the biosciences.  San Francisco is 
home to Stanford University, the University of California Berkeley, and the University of 
California San Francisco.  The Los Angeles region houses the California Institute of 
Technology, the University of California Los Angeles, the University of Southern 
California, and several large research oriented hospitals, such as the City of Hope and the 
Children’s Hospital Los Angeles.   San Diego has long been home to several world class 
biomedical research institutes, such as the Scripps Research Institute and the Salk 
Institute, while the University of California, San Diego has developed a medical school 
and strong departments in chemistry, biology, and other fields with links to 
biotechnology.   
 
Methods: data gathering and network construction 
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The research process has three steps: locating firms, gathering career histories of 
senior managers, and then using social network analysis tools and related descriptive 
statistics to gather and analyze results.   
 
Company demographics within California biotechnology 
 
High failure rates within the biotechnology industry make the identification of 
firms over the history of a regional cluster difficult.  A first step was to locate 
biotechnology companies active at the time of data collection for the study.  A published 
industry directory of the California biotechnology industry (Rich’s, 2006) and several on-
line directories were used as initial screen to identify companies in each region.  The first 
part of the search yielded 319 biotechnology companies active in 2006.   
The second part of the search strategy was to locate failed companies.  A primary 
source used to identify failed companies were career histories of senior managers, which 
often listed previous jobs in failed biotechnology companies.  Additional companies were 
also located through a number of old directories newspaper articles found through 
internet searches (see e.g. San Diego Union Tribune, 2003).  Information on companies 
was found using searches for Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, 
archived company web-pages, and newspaper articles about the company founded 
through Lexis-Nexus and Internet searches. This research yielded 155 biotechnology 
companies which had failed or more commonly had been acquired. 
Table 1 summarizes information on companies located as part of the study on a 
yearly basis from 1976 to 2005.  These figures demonstrate that San Francisco and San 
Diego have developed sizable biotechnology clusters.  The two regions have spawned a 
similar number of companies (208 for San Francisco and 207 for San Diego), and an 
equal number of companies, 68 per region, have achieved the significant milestone of 
achieving a successful initial public offering onto a stock market.  Los Angeles has only 
generated 32 biotechnology companies. Two of these companies, Allergan and ICN 
Pharmaceuticals, are local pharmaceutical companies that took stock market listings 
during the 1970s and moved into biotechnology during the 1980s and 1990s.  Excluding 
these two firms, only one Los Angeles biotechnology company, Amgen, has achieved an 
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initial public offering, in 1983.   Due to its lower failure rate the San Francisco cluster has 
had a larger number of active firms most years, compared to San Diego.  Moreover, the 
data on senior management teams discussed below indicate that its companies are larger, 
in terms of employment.   
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
Gathering senior manager career histories  
 
 Career histories were gathered for all individuals identified as occupying a senior 
management position in a California biotechnology company.  Career histories were first 
gathered for senior managers active in California biotechnology firms at the time of data 
collection, between the Summer of 2006 and Summer 2007.  Career histories for these 
individuals were identified through accessing company web sites, SEC filings, and 
Google Searches, which often yielded press releases announcing career moves of 
individuals.  Much of the data collecting for this project surrounded identifying 
individuals that exited the network prior to 2005.  Many individuals retired, moved to 
roles outside of regional biotechnology firms, such as becoming a venture capitalist, or 
had moved to a company outside California.   
Several strategies were used to locate such individuals that had exited the 
California industry.  First, for the 137 public companies, SEC filings were used to catalog 
senior manager biographies using each company’s IPO prospectus and subsequent annual 
reports.  SEC filings were the most reliable source of career history data, as SEC rules 
mandate that companies provide career details for senior managers going back at least 
five years; in practice most individuals provide complete career data. Second, a public 
web-archive was used to access historical web-pages for all companies in the database 
that had web-pages from 1996.  This database was particularly useful in gathering 
information for most privately held companies active for at least part of their history after 
1996 (a small number of companies have blocked access to old-web pages).  Once names 
of senior managers were gathered from archived web-sites, internet searches were used to 
fill in career histories for senior managers located.  
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 While this search strategy yielded career histories for a large number of senior 
managers active within California biotechnology, there are sources of missing data that 
could bias the results.  For some individuals it was not possible to obtain accurate dates 
of employment for all jobs. As a key goal of the project was to construct the emergence 
of career affiliation networks on a yearly basis, all jobs for which dates were not known 
were dropped from the database.  In practice, most missing dates surrounded scientific 
training or non-biotech related jobs.  Once a person moved into the biotechnology 
industry web-searches, especially using the web-archive, were able to locate dates of 
employment.  Second, data is missing for private companies for which no archived web-
page material is available.  This includes a small number of private companies that have 
blocked access to their historical web page, but, more importantly, all private companies 
active prior to the widespread adoption of internet web-sites in the mid 1990s.   
The issue of missing data during the early history of the cluster is significant, as a 
major goal of this study is trace mechanisms of social network emergence during those 
early years.  Missing data could result in important ties linking senior managers from 
early companies being excluded from the data, suggesting that less connectivity exists 
within the network than is actually the case.  To help minimize the impact of bias, a 
variety of secondary sources were used to supplement the social network analysis. Chief 
among these are a collection of oral histories documenting the early history of 
biotechnology in California (Bancroft Library 2009).  These histories include two over a 
dozen extended interviews surrounding the formation of Genentech and Chiron in San 
Francisco, but also detailed accounts of the emergence of Amgen in Los Angeles and 
Hybritech in San Diego. Several newspaper articles on the history of San Diego 
biotechnology were used to verify information on the role of Hybritech on the cluster’s 
formation.  Finally, in order to highlight differences in the organization of pre-existing 
infrastructures supporting new technology firms across San Diego and San Francisco, 






   
Social network construction and summary data on social structure 
 
A databqase was used to generate career affiliation networks.  Ties between 
individuals are created through joint employment within the same organization.  Under 
this rule of tie formation, ties linking individuals across organizations are only formed 
through job mobility. Upon changing jobs a manager maintains ties with members of the 
old organization, while creating new ties at the new place of employment.  While entire 
careers were captured for most senior managers, individuals are included in network files 
starting the year they begin working for a California biotechnology firm, and are removed 
from networks when they move to either a job outside the California biotechnology 
industry or move to a job outside the state.  Networks were created for each year between 
1976 and 2005. The yearly network data allows detailed process tracing as to the 
formation of the network.  
An important issue surrounding the construction of networks is how long ties 
should be assumed to last once an individual leaves an organization.  Once an individual 
moves jobs there is a probability that ties will decay, or weaken over time as people lose 
contact with one another.  Moreover, and from a network modelling perspective, if ties 
are assumed to last indefinitely, dense social networks become much easier to produce 
and become sustainable.  By creating a model where ties decay, new ties must be 
continuously generated in order for a network to become sustainable.  Following an 
approach implemented in network emergence studies by Uzzi and Spiro (2004) and 
Fleming et al. (2004), the study assumes that ties linking an individual to others within an 
organization cease to exist five years after an individual changes jobs, unless renewed by 
subsequent joint employment at the same organization. As ties linking organizations are 
only produced through mobility, factoring tie decay generates a system in which 
relatively high levels of labor market mobility will be needed to maintain dense social 
networks. 
 Table 2 summarizes data on the number of senior managers identified as well as 
descriptive statistics on social network formation for each region.  The data on 
individuals in the network shows that a significant number of senior managers worked in 
California biotechnology between 1976 and 2005.  At the end of the study’s time frame 
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2285 senior managers were employed in California biotechnology firms.  Over half these 
individuals, 1229 were employed in San Francisco, with 867 employed in San Diego and 
a much smaller number, 199, employed in Los Angeles.  These results mirror the earlier 
data on the number of companies, demonstrating that San Francisco and San Diego have 
developed significant labor market pools for senior biotechnology managers, while Los 
Angeles has not. 
 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
 
 Table 2 also includes summary data on social network formation within each of 
the three regions.  Within table 2 the data on individuals in the main component and 
percent in the mail component relate to the connectivity within the network over time. 
The main component refers to the largest group of individuals within the network that are 
connected to one another by career affiliation ties.  From the 1990s onwards both San 
Diego and San Francisco have relatively large main components in which at least 80% of 
individuals are connected to one another; from the mid-1990s onwards network 
connectivity increases to over 90%.  Moreover, the size of the main component becomes 
relatively large.  This is especially true during the latter years of the network history, 
when over 1000 individuals are connected within the San Francisco network, and over 
800 in San Diego. This data provides support that the two successful biotechnology 
clusters in California, San Francisco and San Diego, both share a network of social ties 
linking senior managers of most companies.   
Los Angeles, on the other hand, has failed to generate significant social ties 
linking companies.  During the 1990s onwards only about 35% of individuals on average 
are connected to one another through the main component.  Moreover, for most years the 
majority of these individuals are senior managers at Amgen, a very large biotechnology 
firm. This data shows suggests that very few individuals employed within Los Angeles 
biotechnology firms have changed jobs to another biotechnology firm in the region.  
Moreover, when people did leave Los Angeles biotechnology firms, they usually moved 
to jobs outside of the region, or left biotechnology, when doing so. Between 1981 (the 
year Amgen was formed) and 2005 there were 170 instances of individuals leaving jobs 
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at Los Angeles biotechnology firms.  In only 21 cases (12% of moves) did people 
relocate to other LA biotech firms.  This compares, for example, to 343 lateral career 
moves within San Francisco biotechnology.  While San Francisco and San Diego may 
have developed patterns of high career mobility across their firms needed to generate a 
decentralized social structure, Los Angeles has not.   
If San Francisco and San Diego have in fact developed decentralized social 
structures, individuals should be able to readily access network ties as conduits to gather 
information and as a source of referral networks for jobs.  Network statistics can 
examining whether the structure of the network, as it evolves over time, becomes 
efficient in developing ties between senior managers and other companies.  How easy is 
it, on average, for members of the network to develop ties to other individuals and firms 
in any given year?  Referrals are often developed by “working the network” or asking 
acquaintances for contacts that may know at target companies.  A common statistic to 
measure indirect ties is average path length, or “degrees of separation,” between 
individuals in the network.   
The final columns of table 2 displays path length between individuals located 
within the network main component on a yearly basis.  The Los Angeles findings are 
somewhat meaningless, as low path lengths are driven by the small size of the main 
component during most years.  Focusing again on San Francisco and San Diego, during 
the early history of the region path length data is low in both regions, at less than 2 ties.  
This is due to the small size of the network.  However, from 1990 onwards the average 
path length averages at about 3.5 to 4 in San Diego and 3 to 3.5 in San Francisco.  The 
stability in the average path length statistic in both regions is impressive given the rapid 
growth of the size of the social network linking individuals. This is particularly striking 
in the San Francisco area.  In 2005, for example, an individual located within the network 
main component could reach, on average, any one of the other 1120 through an average 
of 3.4 referral ties.  Hundreds of individuals, and dozens of companies, are reachable to 





   
Patterns of network emergence within California biotechnology 
 
 The San Francisco and San Diego regions have generated large biotechnology 
clusters and dense career affiliation networks that are indicative of decentralized social 
structures.  Drawing on the institutional and constructivist approaches outlined earlier, 
the following examines in more detail the trajectories of social network emergence within 
these two regions. 
 
San Francisco Bay Area: inheriting biotechnology from Silicon Valley 
  
Recent research on the origins of biotechnology have stressed the importance of 
San Francisco as a hub of interdisciplinary molecular biology and genetics research (see 
e.g. Jong 2006).  A 1973 collaboration between Stanley Cohen of Stanford and Robert 
Boyer of UCSF lead to the first successful use of restriction enzymes and plasmids to 
successfully splice a gene from one organism into another.  A few years later, the 
William Rutter and Howard Goodman labs at UCSF collaborated to successfully “clone” 
the gene responsible for expressing the insulin protein in rats and then successfully splice 
it into the e-coli bacteria.  Shortly thereafter, in August 1978 the Boyer Lab at UCSF, 
financed by Genentech, led the collaboration to repeat this experiment using the human 
insulin gene, but with synthetically manufactured DNA (see Hall 1987).  Several 
prominent scientists in the region, including Boyer, Rutter, and Arthur Korberg from 
Stanford, would found early biotechnology companies, which would then employ key 
junior scientists from their labs to carry forward research.  There can be no doubt that the 
founding of San Francisco’s early biotechnology firms, such as Genentech, Chiron and 
DNAX, must be linked to the invention of basic genetic engineering tools within these 
firms founding academic labs (Kenney 1986).   
According to this logic, San Francisco was first to have a biotechnology industry 
due to the excellence of its science.  The implication of this explanation is that the 
regions experiencing early success in biotechnology did so because they were co-located 
with prominent labs active in the academic biotechnology revolution.  However, this does 
not necessarily imply that regions that developed early firms within the history of the 
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industry would go on to develop large regional clusters.  In a study of the biotechnology 
industry’s formation, Romanelli and Feldman (2006) show that Dallas, Durham, 
Philadelphia, Washington DC, and Albuquerque joined San Francisco, San Diego, and 
Boston in housing at least one biotechnology firm prior to 1980.  However, only the latter 
three regions developed sizable biotechnology clusters.  It does not necessarily hold true 
that the early formation of one or more biotechnology firms creates an advantage leading 
to the broader development of a regional cluster.   
 The San Francisco region was able to rapidly develop a sizable biotechnology 
industry, housing 7 firms in 1980, 22 firms in 1985, and 49 firms in 1990.  The 
explanation offered here focuses more on institutional factors.  The San Francisco Bay 
area biotechnology industry expanded as quickly as it did because it inherited the 
institutional infrastructure created during the 1960s and 1970s within the Silicon Valley 
semiconductor and computer industries.  Genentech provided a powerful demonstration 
effect of the promise of biotechnology.  As numerous academic labs were active in 
genetic engineering and related molecular biology fields linked to biotechnology, it is not 
surprising that numerous follow-on biotechnology companies developed.  However, 
Silicon Valley had a pre-existing social structure supporting high-tech entrepreneurialism, 
carried forward within the region by a cadre of successful entrepreneurs and, of central 
importance to early biotechnology firms, a large and successful venture capital industry.  
Evidence from this paper’s study of social network emergence within the region as well 
as supplemental data on the activities of venture capitalists in funding Bay Area 
biotechnology companies support this explanation.   
Data from table 2 shows that San Francisco companies were able to recruit 
significantly more senior managers to join individual firms compared to San Diego.  
While this true over the entire history of both clusters, this finding is particularly 
important during the formative years of biotechnology.  Thus, in 1980 while San Diego 
firms employed only 7 senior managers (most of which were involved with Hybritech), 
San Francisco firms had 41.  By 1983 this disparity reached 104 to 27, and 149 to 47 in 
1985.  San Francisco biotechnology firms were able to attract dozens of senior managers, 
this at an early stage in the industry when only Genentech had demonstrated success and 
no firm had achieved profitability.  This evidence is consistent with the explanation that a 
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social structure encouraging mobility into high-risk firms was established within the 
region’s emerging biotechnology industry at the time of its formation. 
 A key element of narratives accounting for the success of the Silicon Valley 
semiconductor and computer industry is the willingness of individuals to found new 
companies.  Drawing on the widely known history of the founding of Fairfield 
Semiconductors by the “traitorous eight” engineers from Shockley Semiconductors in 
1957 (see Lécuyer 2006), Silicon Valley is rife with instances of senior employees 
leaving their firm to found rival companies.  Evidence suggests that norms favoring the 
founding of companies have spread to the Bay Area biotechnology industry.  Table 3 
draws from the database on the founders of California biotechnology firms to examine 
the number of founders in each region as well as the frequency of serial foundings.  This 
table shows that the San Francisco area has the most individual biotechnology founders, 
at 269, compared to 179 in San Diego and 106 in Los Angeles.  However, San Francisco 
biotechnology company founders have a much higher frequency of becoming serial 
entrepreneurs: 128 individuals, close to half of all founders, have started two or more 
companies. Eleven individuals have founded 5 or more companies in San Francisco. This 
compares to a rate of only 25% of individuals becoming serial founders in San Diego, 
and 20% in Los Angeles.  Indeed, San Francisco has more serial founders in 
biotechnology than Los Angeles has founders.  This difference in entrepreneurialism 
supports the notion that social norms in San Francisco strongly encourage the founding of 
companies – even if this means leaving a successful enterprise to do so.   
 
--- table 3 about here --- 
 
 A decentralized social structure encouraging the formation and employment 
within biotech firms existed early on in San Francisco biotechnology.  But by what 
mechanisms did these norms become embedded within the new industry?  The career 
history database shows that no senior managers employed within San Francisco 
biotechnology firms during the 1976-1985 period had worked in a Bay Area 
semiconductor or computer firm.  Most early senior managers employed with San 
Francisco biotechnology firms had previous careers in academic science or were 
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recruited into the Bay Area from chemical or pharmaceutical companies outside the 
region and were thus novice employees of high-technology start-ups.  Most managers 
working within early San Francisco companies apparently did not bring such norms into 
firms through earlier career experiences within the region.  It is possible that norms 
encouraging social ties across firms and frequent mobility were “in the air” and may have 
been transferred to local companies through informal social interaction with other 
entrepreneurs and high-technology employees active in the area.  However, a more direct 
explanation lies with the organization of most of the area’s early biotechnology firms by 
local venture capitalists. 
 The venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins is well-known for its role in backing 
Cetus in 1973 and then Genentech in 1976 (see Hall 1987).  Kleiner Perkins adopted 
strategies of allocating capital to Genentech in several allotments that increased in size 
over time as the company achieved technical milestones leading, eventually, to its initial 
public offering in 1980.  Kleiner Perkins also asserted strong control of the firm through 
organizing Genentech’s Board of Directors.  Both tactics were imported directly from 
common venture capital tactics used in the semiconductor and computer industries.  
However, Kleiner Perkins was not otherwise active in funding San Francisco 
biotechnology firms. After funding several rounds of Genentech’s development in the 
late 1970s the company would not invest in another Bay Area biotechnology firm until 
1987, when it invested in Penederm.  In terms of directly funding firms, Kleiner Perkins 
was far more active in the San Diego area, as will be discussed shortly. 
 Kleiner Perkin’s success with Genentech did, however, play an important 
demonstration effect within the Bay Area.  Between 1976 and 1985 twenty Bay Area 
venture capitalists would become active in funding San Francisco based biotechnology 
firms.  Twenty six biotechnology start-ups were founded during this period, implying that 
most VCs invested in one, or possibly two biotechnology firms.  This suggests that most 
early venture capital investors into biotechnology were conservative, investing in one 
biotech or at most two biotechnology firms to gain a foothold in this new industry, but 
also limiting their investment exposure to this industry given its high technological risk 
and unproven business models.   From this perspective, the existence of a large venture 
capital industry in San Francisco helps directly explain why the region was first to 
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develop a significant number of biotechnology firms.  San Francisco had more venture 
capital companies, and thus could support more start-ups.   
As with Kleiner Perkins, most early venture capital investors into San Francisco 
firms had prior experience primarily in funding semiconductor and computer firms.   The 
strategies used by Kleiner Perkins in financing Genentech would be adopted by almost all 
other Bay Area biotechnology firms and, within a few years, become the standard 
template for organizing biotechnology firms across the world.  As Pisano (2006) has 
recently argued, the “anatomy” by which biotechnology firms have been organized and 
funded draws from venture financing in the electronics industry.  However, within San 
Francisco VC investors also are likely to have imprinted broader elements of the “Silicon 
Valley model” into area companies.   As venture capitalists began to organize 
biotechnology firms in the region, it is likely that they imprinted patterns of financing and 
organizing new technology that were borrowed from norms established within the 
semiconductor and computer industry.  This included norms of high career mobility 
across companies and a willingness for key employees to leave companies to become 
entrepreneurs active in founding other companies.  The development of frequent job 
hopping within the San Francisco biotechnology industry followed, allowing the region 
to develop the social networks needed to support a decentralized social structure. 
 
San Diego biotechnology: construction of a network backbone 
 
 While the biotechnology firms in San Francisco may be considered fortunate in 
inheriting both a social structure and underlying venture financing industry that were 
well-suited for the industry, biotechnology entrepreneurs in San Diego had to construct 
its regional infrastructure.  As seen in table 1, the region went from having virtually no 
presence in commercial biotechnology at the start of the 1980s to developing one of the 
world’s most vibrant biotechnology clusters by the late 1990s  (see also DeVol et. al. 
2005).  While San Diego has recently developed a cluster of wireless telecom companies 
to complement its biotechnology presence (see Simard 2004), the region did not have a 
presence in high technology industry during the late 1970s, and was primarily known for 
its large naval base and defense contractors.  This suggests that its biotechnology sector 
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was the first high-technology industry to develop in the region, with the implication that 
early companies could not draw on previously established local venture capitalists, labor 
market pools, or other resources.   
Given the more organic pattern of cluster emergence in San Diego, a key issue to 
investigate is whether a mechanism developed to overcome collective action problems 
surrounding the early growth of flexible labor markets. Through coupling network 
analysis with a closer analysis of history of the cluster’s key firms it is possible to 
examine the mechanisms by which the network emerged.  This leads to a narrative 
surrounding a network backbone.  An interesting finding in San Diego is that a network 
backbone did develop, and can be attributed almost entirely to the career strategies of a 
set senior managers with ties to Hybritech, a prominent early San Diego biotech company.  
A parallel analytic narrative, also strongly linked to Hybritech, surrounds the 
development of a significant venture capital industry in the region. 
While a small number of biotechnology companies existed in San Diego by the 
early 1980s, only Hybritech was launched by a world class team of venture capitalists, 
scientific founders, and general managers.  Hybritech was founded in late 1978.   The 
company commercialized technology developed at UCSD by Ivor Royston and Howard 
Birndorf.  Hybritech received immediate credibility due to its ability to attract funding 
from Kleiner Perkins.  The VC firm had recently hired Brooks Byers as venture 
capitalists specializing in biotechnology.  Byers assumed responsibility for the initial 
organization and business direction of Hybritech and became the firm’s interim CEO.  
Byers went on to recruit an experienced management team, lead by Howard Greene, one 
of several up and coming young general managers who left the medical device firm 
Baxter to accept leadership positions within the first generation of US biotechnology 
start-ups (Higgins 2005).  During the early 1980s, Hybritech developed a range of 
diagnostic tests drawing on monoclonal antibody technology.  Because these tests did not 
require a significant regulatory approval process, they could be marketed within months 
of their invention.  
Hybritech thus became one of the few biotechnology firms to achieve profitability 
early in its existence, and successfully completed an IPO in 1981.  While an important 
early biotechnology firm, Hybritech has become much more famous for its role in 
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“seeding” biotechnology in San Diego.  After its IPO the two scientific founders of 
Hybritech, became interested in founding additional companies.  While staying involved 
with Hybritech, in 1983 Royston and Birndorf helped launch Gen-Probe, another 
molecular diagnostics company drawing on technology developed at UCSD and 
Hybritech. The lead venture capital investor in Gen-Probe was again Kleiner Perkins.  In 
1985 a second spin-out called IDEC was launched by Royston and Birndorf.  The 
company applied Hybritech monoclonal antibody technology to conduct drug discovery 
research.  IDEC was again initially funded primarily through Kleiner Perkins, with 
Birndorf becoming CEO.  IDEC eventually became arguably San Diego’s most 
successful biotechnology company, developing an important cancer therapy, Rituxan. 
In 1986 Hybritech was acquired by the large pharmaceutical firm Lilly for $300 
million plus about $100 million Lilly shares (Crabtree 2003).  This acquisition had the 
immediate effect of transforming Hybritech’s top management team, all of whom owned 
shares in the company, into extremely wealthy individuals.  As part of the acquisition, the 
top management team was encouraged to remain, but Hybritech became a subsidiary of a 
large Indiana based pharmaceutical company with a relatively conservative managerial 
ethos. Hybritech had developed a free-flowing, informal corporate culture typical of 
technology start-ups.  This created immediate clashes with the Lilly managers.  Tina 
Nova, one of the senior scientists at Hybritech, reflects that “It was like ‘Animal House’ 
meets ‘The Waltons.’” (Fikes, 1999).  Lilly was unable to integrate Hybritech’s 
management and scientific team into its corporate culture, and in the years immediately 
following the acquisition most of the former Hybritech senior managers left the firm.   
The cadre of former Hybritech managers are now widely credited within San 
Diego for “seeding” the San Diego biotechnology industry.  This group of managers 
could serve as a reliable and trusted referral network to one another.  These managers had 
the financial resources, managerial experience, and a reputation for developing one of the 
biotechnology industry’s early and rare success stories. Their credibility as successful 
biotech entrepreneurs was also important in recruiting highly skilled individuals to join 
San Diego start-ups to which the Hybritech managers were linked.  Managers from 
Hybritech went on to found or take senior management position in at least twelve 
companies formed between 1986 and 1990.  A study conducted in 2002 found over 40 
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biotechnology companies in San Diego employing a senior manager or board advisor 
linked to Hybritech (UCSD Connect, 2002).   
 In addition to helping to form new companies, the former Hybritech managers 
were instrumental in the creation of a local venture capital industry in San Diego.  Prior 
to 1986 most (of the few) companies founded in San Diego drew on venture capitalists 
from outside the region, predominately from Silicon Valley.  Kleiner Perkins played an 
especially important role in funding San Diego companies. In addition to its earlier 
investments in Hybritech, Gen-Probe, and IDEC, between 1986 and 1990 the firm went 
on to fund several new companies linked to Royston and Birndorf and drawing from ex-
Hybritech managers. These include Ligand, Gensia, Genta, and Nanogen. Birndorf 
developed a reputation with local venture capitalists as an excellent CEO of early stage 
biotechnology companies, and became initial CEO Ligand, Gensia, and Nanogen, where 
he remained for several years. Royston eventually became a venture capitalist, founding 
Forward Ventures, which became a prominent San Diego venture capital company during 
the 1990s.   
 In addition to the companies linked to Kleiner Perkins and the scientific founders 
of Hybritech, a second clique of companies was started during the 1986-1990 period by a 
group of managers linked to Howard Greene, the former CEO of Hybritech.  Greene had 
recruited several other former Baxter colleagues to Hybritech.  After leaving Hybritech 
Grene co-founded with Tim Wollaeger, another former Baxter executive from Hybritech,  
a short-lived venture capital seed investment company called Biovest.  Biovest proceeded 
to invest in six San Diego biotech start-ups, most founded or managed by former 
Hybritech employees.  The Biovest partners concluded their partnership by each founding 
a new company.  Greene founded and became long-term CEO of Amylin, which 
eventually became a company focused on the development of insulin drugs and 
eventually grew into a large publicly traded firm.  Wollaeger founded Biosite, another 
molecular diagnostics company.  In 1993 Wollaeger left Biosite to become a full-time 
venture capitalist, opening the San Diego office of Kingsbury Partners.   
In addition to founding numerous companies, a credible social network backbone 
was forged around the former Hybritech managers.  Network visualizations, shown in 
figures 1, can help document this process (see Casper 2007a for additional network 
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visualization analysis of San Diego biotechnology). Within these figures the dots or 
nodes represent senior managers, and the edges between them represent ties.  To simplify 
the network figures, individuals with no ties to other people within the network (so-called 
isolates) were removed from the analysis.  Managers with career affiliations to Hybritech 
are colored black, while all other individuals are shaded gray.  The visualization from 
1984 shows that while a few biotechnology firms existed within San Diego, there were 
no career affiliation network ties linking any firm except Gen-Probe, the Hybritech spin-
out.  By 1987, the development of new firms founded primarily by ex-Hybritech 
managers was well-underway.  While fragile, a coherent network linking many of the 
region’s firms now exists.  By 1995 a robust network has formed linking a large number 
of companies.  All ties to Hybritech had decayed from the network, and, while most 
former Hybritech managers were still active within the biotechnology community, their 
central role in holding the network together appears to have declined.  Labor market 
mobility within the region was sufficient to create sustainable career affiliation networks 
linking most firms in the region. 
 
--- figures 1 about here (attached) --- 
 
The mechanism of network emergence surrounding the failed Hybritech 
acquisition helps justify the claim that dynamics surrounding the formation of an 
appropriate social structure within the region were important in explaining the success of 
San Diego in developing a large cluster of companies.  Through both seeding a 
generation of follow-on companies and creating a web of social ties across the new firms, 
the clique of managers linked to Hybritech helped establish a decentralized social 




This study helped identify mechanisms by which social networks linked to career 
mobility emerged and became sustainable across California’s biotechnology industry.  
Drawing on research from economic sociology, the article has linked the development of 
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large, sustainable biotechnology clusters to the creation of a decentralized social 
infrastructure supporting individuals and companies within the region.  Empirical studies 
have demonstrated that large technology clusters only rarely emerge.  In this respect, one 
contribution of this study is to document the existence of decentralized social structures 
in two successful biotechnology clusters, San Francisco and San Diego.  The empirical 
results also demonstrate a correlation between the failure of Los Angeles to develop a 
large biotechnology industry and the lack of career affiliation networks linking 
companies within the region.   
Insights from social theory can help conceptualize scenarios of social structure 
emergence, which were then used to create analytic narratives helping to explore the 
emergence of successful biotechnology clusters in San Francisco and San Diego.  
Drawing on institutional theory, it was argued that San Francisco biotechnology 
developed rapidly because the region’s firms inherited a suitable social structure from  
Silicon Valley.  One issue needing more exploration is the identification of precise 
mechanisms by which norms associated with the Silicon Valley electronics industry were 
transferred into the newly emerging biotechnology industry.  A likely suspect, however, 
is that the area’s venture capitalists were carriers of such norms.  More generally, the 
existence of a large venture capital industry in San Francisco willing to invest in 
unproven biotechnology firms helps explain why San Francisco was able to quickly 
obtain a critical mass in the new industry. 
One implication of the inheritance scenario is that, once a region succeeds in 
developing one high-technology industry, it may be able to leverage this success to 
develop additional high-technology industries that draw upon similar social structure 
supports.  Silicon Valley is known for creating several new technology industries, 
ranging from first electronics and biotechnology to software, internet technologies, and 
more recently nanotechnology and biofuels.  San Diego, after experiencing success in 
biotechnology in the mid-1980s San Diego was able to soon after develop an important 
wireless telecommunications industry.  While an attractive scenario, a region must no 
doubt have adequate factor conditions to support spin-outs in the new industry.  Simard 
(2004), for example, has shown that San Diego’s wireless telecommunications industry 
drew on signal processing technologies developed through governmental research in the 
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area sponsored by the Navy. Nevertheless, if social structures do prove fungible across 
sectors, this provides a strong justification for the support of policies promoting new 
technology development within existing technology clusters.  
 Entrepreneurs contemplating the creation of new technology firms in most regions, 
however, have little to inherit.  Research suggests that very few regional technology 
clusters have developed decentralized social structures.  If so, then actors within most 
regions must construct the social infrastructure.  The failure of biotechnology in Los 
Angeles demonstrates that promising starting conditions (a leading early firm, Amgen, 
and strong university research) will not necessarily lead to the formation of social 
networks supporting further development spirals.  Further research into “failure case” 
such as Los Angeles is needed to help understand why the success of companies such as 
Amgen did not lead to the types of labor market mobility or social network formation 
found in nearby San Diego or San Francisco. 
The San Diego biotechnology case, however, does show that decentralized social 
structures can emerge.  The failure of Lilly’s acquisition of Hybritech lead to the 
establishment of a viable social network backbone supporting San Diego biotechnology 
from the late 1980s onwards.  The development of this backbone was orchestrated 
through the activities of social cliques linked to the scientific founders of Hybritech and 
Kleiner Perkins, on one hand, and the group of former Baxter employees linked through 
Hybritech, on the other. The emergence of San Diego biotechnology demonstrates how a 
region can start with a minimal infrastructure for biotechnology and, a few years later, 
emerge as a leading center of excellence in the field.  But in a larger sense the sequence 
of events surrounding the failed acquisition Hybritech was idiosyncratic and in no sense 
planned.   
Governments around the world are busy orchestrating the development of 
technology clusters.  Due to the centrality of university research in the formation of 
biotechnology, this sector is a chosen target for governments. A primary strategy used by 
governments, particularly in Europe, is to use financial instruments to seed the 
development of numerous early entrants within a regional cluster (see Casper 2007b).  
While this strategy may create a critical mass of firm, it all bur ignores the social context 
of successful biotechnology clusters.  This article privileged shared career experiences as 
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the source of key social ties that, over time, can catalyze the development of a viable 
regional social structure.  Can government policies orchestrate the development of such 
entrepreneurial networks?  Exploring this issue is an important question for future 
research on the development of technology industries. 
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Figures and tables: 
 
  Total 
Firms 
    Entrants     Exits     IPOs     Public 
Firms 
    
  SF SD LA SF SD LA SF SD LA SF SD LA SF SD LA 
1976 2 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1977 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1978 2 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1979 5 2 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1980 7 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
1981 13 4 4 6 2 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 2 
1982 16 8 5 3 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 
1983 15 10 5 0 2 1 0 0 0 4 1 1 6 2 3 
1984 17 14 5 2 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 2 3 
1985 22 17 8 5 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 7 3 3 
1986 25 22 9 3 6 1 1 1 1 2 1 0 8 3 3 
1987 29 31 10 5 10 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 8 6 3 
1988 38 38 10 9 7 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 8 7 3 
1989 43 45 10 5 7 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 8 8 3 
1990 49 47 10 6 2 0 2 3 0 0 1 0 8 9 3 
1991 61 52 11 14 8 0 4 0 0 3 8 0 9 17 3 
1992 66 61 14 9 9 3 0 1 0 9 5 0 18 22 3 
1993 69 65 13 3 5 3 0 1 0 7 3 0 25 25 3 
1994 80 70 13 11 6 1 0 4 1 4 1 0 29 24 3 
1995 91 75 13 11 9 2 3 2 0 2 4 0 30 27 3 
1996 94 83 16 6 10 4 3 2 0 8 6 0 36 33 3 
1997 109 97 19 18 16 0 4 5 2 2 6 0 35 36 3 
1998 133 116 19 28 23 2 3 6 1 0 1 0 32 34 3 
1999 140 120 21 10 11 1 9 3 1 3 1 0 31 34 3 
2000 142 142 25 11 26 1 0 8 1 13 10 0 44 39 3 
2001 149 147 23 7 13 0 6 9 2 0 2 0 42 38 3 
2002 154 147 24 11 9 1 7 4 0 1 1 0 40 37 3 
2003 159 150 24 12 8 1 8 9 0 2 2 0 41 36 3 
2004 157 144 25 5 1 1 8 4 0 3 4 0 43 40 3 
2005 149 142 23 2 4 0 4 9 0 2 4 0 44 40 3 
        208 207 31 63 73 10 68 68 1       
Table 1: Company statistics for California biotechnology clusters, 1976-2005 
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  Individuals in Network Individuals in Main Component Percent in Main Component 
Average Path Length within Main 
Component 
  SF SD LA SF SD LA SF SD LA SF SD LA 
1976 23    13    56.5%    1.3     
1977 24    9    37.5%    1.0     
1978 28 2   12 2   42.9% 100.0%   1.3 1.0   
1979 31 4   11 3   35.5% 75.0%   1.3 1.0   
1980 41 7 14 12 4 9 29.3% 57.1% 64.3% 1.2 1.0 1.0 
1981 60 9 18 24 4 11 40.0% 44.4% 61.1% 1.3 1.0 1.0 
1982 86 19 20 41 9 12 47.7% 47.4% 60.0% 1.3 1.0 1.0 
1983 104 27 28 50 15 17 48.1% 55.6% 60.7% 1.2 1.0 1.2 
1984 124 39 33 47 17 18 46.0% 43.6% 54.5% 1.2 1.1 1.0 
1985 149 47 37 105 24 18 70.5% 51.1% 48.6% 2.4 1.2 1.0 
1986 166 59 44 113 35 19 68.1% 59.3% 43.2% 2.3 1.8 1.0 
1987 205 78 47 105 57 20 51.2% 73.1% 42.6% 1.8 2.8 1.0 
1988 233 107 51 175 81 21 75.1% 75.7% 41.2% 3.8 3.1 1.0 
1989 266 132 58 202 103 24 75.9% 78.0% 41.4% 3.4 3.3 1.0 
1990 312 165 64 248 135 25 79.5% 81.8% 39.1% 2.9 3.9 1.0 
1991 359 188 67 300 151 26 83.6% 80.3% 38.8% 2.9 3.7 1.0 
1992 420 232 75 361 204 29 86.0% 87.9% 38.7% 3.0 3.8 1.0 
1993 470 273 78 402 243 29 85.5% 89.0% 37.2% 3.0 4.1 1.0 
1994 531 317 83 462 290 30 87.0% 91.5% 36.1% 3.1 4.0 1.0 
1995 597 342 99 543 300 35 91.0% 87.7% 35.4% 3.1 3.6 1.0 
1996 669 397 108 608 347 38 90.9% 87.4% 35.2% 3.2 3.5 1.1 
1997 743 452 119 662 409 37 89.1% 90.5% 31.1% 3.2 3.6 1.1 
1998 837 503 126 764 466 36 91.3% 92.6% 28.6% 3.1 3.6 1.1 
1999 910 547 133 847 498 72 93.1% 91.0% 54.1% 3.2 3.6 2.0 
2000 1004 624 122 944 559 41 94.0% 89.6% 33.6% 3.1 3.8 1.3 
2001 1079 702 154 1029 648 56 95.4% 92.3% 36.4% 3.3 3.8 2.0 
2002 1134 771 173 1075 719 58 94.8% 93.3% 33.5% 3.2 3.8 2.0 
2003 1187 817 186 1117 760 58 94.1% 93.0% 31.2% 3.8 3.8 2.3 
2004 1204 852 197 1122 806 86 93.2% 94.6% 43.7% 3.4 3.9 2.4 
2005 1229 867 199 1121 824 78 91.2% 95.0% 39.2% 3.4 4.2 2.3 
Table 2: Social Network Statistics: Senior Managers Employed within San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles Biotechnology 
Clusters, 1976-2005





LA SD SF 
1 80% (85) 75% (134) 54% (146) 
2 12% (13) 19% (34) 26%  (69) 
3 4%    (4) 4.5% (8) 12%  (32) 
4 2%    (2) 1%    (2) 4%    (11)  
5 or more 2%    (2) .5%   (1) 4%    (11) 
Repeat Founders 20% (21) 25% (45) 46% (123) 
Total # Founders 106 179 269 






= Non-Hybritech Alumni 

















Figure 1: San Diego Career Affiliation Visualizations 
